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Challenge funds in international development: definitions, 
variations and research directions 
James Copestake and Anne-Marie O’Riordan. October 2014. 
 
Summary 
The use of challenge funds to promote economic and social development continues 
to grow, but has been the subject of relatively little research. This article draws on 
institutional economics (particularly principal-agent theory) to define challenge funds 
and review how they differ from other development funding mechanisms, taking into 
account their purpose, financial terms, inter-agency relationships, screening 
processes, selection mechanisms, implementation and risk sharing characteristics. It 
then draws on web based data for fifty challenge funds to analyse variation in some 
of these characteristics. The paper identifies evaluability as an important influence, 
including the relative importance attached to promoting the financial performance of 
grantees relative to the indirect social benefits of their activities. We conclude with 
suggestions for further research into the design and performance of challenge funds. 
 
1. Introduction 
Challenge funds (CFs) are an increasingly prominent aid modality, favoured 
particularly by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) but also 
used by many other agencies as a means to promote poverty reduction through 
support for both for-profit and non-profit organisations. Their adoption by DFID can 
be traced back to the “reinventing government” policy agenda of the 1979-90 
Thatcher governments, and their use particularly for urban regeneration (Foley, 
1999; John and Ward, 2005:73; Brownhill, 2007). The Joint Funding Scheme for 
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providing matching funds to UK development NGOs was also established in this 
period, and by 1992/93 is was allocating £28 million a year to more than 1,000 
projects (Gibson, 1993:184). The first business oriented or enterprise CF within the 
British aid programme was the UK Business Sector Challenge Fund, launched in 
1997/98. This was followed by the Financial Deepening Challenge Fund and the 
Business Linkages Challenge Fund in 2000. A web search in July 2013 identified 
more than fifty live or recently closed challenge funds being operated by 
development agencies, with a combined portfolio of grants worth more than £1 
billion. Of these 39 were being operated solely or jointly by DFID (see Appendix).  
The rise of CFs in international development can  be linked to debate over how far 
the sheer complexity of many development problems undermines attempts to 
address them through hierarchically coordinated ‘grand plans’ and blue-prints (e.g. 
Easterly 2006; Mowles, 2010; Ramalingam, 2013) and can better be addressed by 
more decentralised, flexible and adaptive ‘quasi-market’ approaches. Yet, 
surprisingly the use of CFs to promote international development has been the 
subject of relatively little research. Poulton and Macartney (2012) are one exception. 
They discuss CFs alongside other forms of public-private partnership to stimulate 
investment in agricultural value chains in Africa. Following Hart and Holmstrom 
(1987) they adopt a principal-agency framework that distinguishes between the 
principal’s information deficit relative to possible agents with respect to (i) their 
capability and motivation, (ii) behaviour once in receipt of funding, or (iii) greater 
knowledge of contextual contingencies affecting performance. CFs set up a 
tournament through which agents have to reveal their thinking about how they could 
promote stated goals in specific contexts. By assessing the quality of this thinking 
the fund provider can assess the range, quality and motivation of potential agents, 
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and at least partly address the risk of adverse selection. Bids also provide 
information that can be used to assess goal congruence with potential agents, and to 
design appropriate contracts and monitoring systems to mitigate moral hazard 
problems (Waterman and Meier, 1998). At the same time, CFs are a cost sharing 
mechanism through which the funder can influence the incentive of bidders to 
undertake more risky activities than they otherwise would. In this respect, they 
resemble sharecropping contracts whose design has also been explained by the 
need to balance risk sharing with transaction cost minimisation considerations in the 
presence of information asymmetry (Stiglitz, 1974). In both cases, principal-agency 
theory suggests a possible spectrum between more ‘hands-on’ and higher 
transaction cost designs (with less delegation of autonomy and risk) at one end of 
the spectrum, and lighter touch designs (with greater risk sharing) at the other. As 
with sharecropping, there are strong a priori grounds for anticipating heterogeneity 
and complexity in the design of CFs, hence a case for ensuring that theorising about 
them is complemented by more naturalistic enquiry into how they have evolved in 
practice.  
This article first contributes towards a more rigorous definition of challenge 
funds by  clarifying how they differ from other development funding mechanisms. It 
then draws on a database of fifty challenge funds to review variation in the way they 
are designed and managed. It concludes with suggestions for further research to 
augment the limited publicly available evidence to inform design and use of 
challenge funds as an aid modality. 
 
2. What is a challenge fund? 
Foley (1999) draws on the 1996 HM Treasury Challenge Handbook to suggest that  
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challenge funds have seven essential features: public competition, scarcity of funds, 
performance related payment, implementation by the bidder, partnership, innovation 
and  private sector participation. Not all these characteristics are referred to in more 
recent definitions. For example, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines 
challenge funds as “open financing mechanisms that allocate grant funding through 
a competitive process… to meet specific objectives” (Co-op Africa, 2010:2).  The 
Swedish International Development Agency (2013) emphasises their role in 
allocating donor money for specific purposes in a predefined field. Problem-solving, 
risk sharing and innovation are also widely cited as important, though often by 
authors who identify challenge funds exclusively with private sector development 
(e.g. Armstrong et al.,2011:5; Gulrajani, 2013:3; Heinrich, 2013:6; KPMG, 2012:1).  
To arrive at a definition for this paper, we draw on the core idea of a 
challenge: that one agency defines a goal but invites others to achieve it. We also 
link it to core features of any financing instrument: that it entails the transfer of 
resources from one party to another, for specified purposes, subject to rules or 
norms governing screening, monitoring and enforcement, in line with an explicit or 
implicit contract. These elements led us to the following seven point definition:  a 
challenge fund (1) provides grants or subsidies (2) between legally independent 
agencies (3) with an explicit public purpose defined by the grant provider (4) on the 
basis of publicly advertised rules and procedures, where (5) grant recipients are 
selected competitively and (6) retain significant discretion over formulation and 
execution of their proposals (7) but share risks with the grant provider. 
 A test of the robustness of this definition is whether it establishes a clear 
distinction between challenge funds and other common terms used to specify 
development financing mechanisms. Table 1 summarises our exploration of this 
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issue. It suggests, first, that open research grants share all the characteristics of 
challenge funds set out above,  differing only in their public purpose. In particular, 
they are similarly open-ended with respect to the mechanism linking goal 
achievement to disbursement of money. Information asymmetry between funder and 
fund recipient is also integral to both: if this were not the case then the grant giver 
could either carry out the activity directly itself, or could outsource it to another 
agency through a contract that specified activities and performance targets more 
tightly, thereby also transferring much more of the risk of performance shortfalls.1  
 Use of the term ‘managed fund’ generally suggests a more fluid portfolio of 
funding agreements set up through a less open and public process than is the case 
with CFs . The terms also imply that the funder retains greater control. One possible 
rationale for this is that discrete projects cannot be appraised in isolation from each 
other, but need instead to be assessed as complementary elements of a joined-up 
strategy for achieving systemic change. Examples include funds to support linked 
technical and institutional innovation in specified sub-sectors, value-chains and 
geographical corridors, including those that take a systemic approach to “making 
markets work for the poor” (e.g. Boomgard et al., 1992; M4P, 2008). 
Interdependence also underpins integrated or sector-wide programmes of 
investment and policy reform, including those that seek to mobilise demand for 
services from marginalised groups as well as to improve their supply (e.g. DFID, 
2005). Managed investment funds have also been widely used in the health sector to 
promote research in neglected fields, including anti-malarial drugs and HIV/AIDS. 
                                               
1 As with challenge funds, and despite extensive informal discussion among academics, 
scholarly research into competitive research fund allocation is surprisingly thin. One 
exception is their use  to finance agricultural research. For example, cross-section evidence 
from the USA suggests that competitive grant allocation between States does not lead to 
more innovation (measured by relative State-level crop yields) than grant allocation based 
on more stable and predictable needs-based formulae (Huffman and Evenson, 2006).  
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Poulton and Macartney (2012:103) suggest that such funds mature slowly because 
managers take time to acquire relevant expertise, networks and trust.2   
 The public purpose of ‘prize funds’ is less clear, as these can also serve as a 
corporate public relations tool, for example. They also primarily reward past 
performance of the recipient (who may not even have to bid) and suggest weaker 
expectations about how funds will be spent and for what purpose. Nevertheless prize 
fellowships, such as offered by the Ashoka Foundation or the Stars Foundation, bear 
strong similarities to the challenge fund model. ‘Technical assistance projects’ not 
only restrict use of grants or subsidies to in-kind services, but resemble managed 
funds in being more proactively and less transparently controlled by the funding 
agency. The other mechanisms listed in Table 1 unambiguously differ from challenge 
funds with respect to at least one characteristic. Advanced market commitments and 
social impact bonds explicitly seek contractually to transfer risk between agencies 
(from and to the private sector, respectively), rather than to share risk and 
uncertainty between them. ‘Social impact investment’ generally entails pro-active 
placement of funds rather than open and competitive selection processes. This is 
often the case with public investment which also takes place within hierarchical 
government structures allowing tighter control over implementation. Lastly, venture 
capital funds are more narrowly commercial in orientation, and public procurement 
focuses on minimising cost and uncertainty over sub-contracts that are more fully 
specified. Overall, this brief discussion supports the idea that there is a useful  
distinction to be drawn between challenge funds (embracing  competitive research 
funding mechanisms) and other financing mechanisms.  
                                               
2 The terms global fund (e.g. Isenman et al. 2010) and social fund (Mallet and Slater, 2013) 
are omitted from the list because their use is even vaguer: encompassing both managed 
funds and challenge funds as defined above, for example. 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3. Variation in the characteristics of challenge funds  
The empirical component of this paper is based on data for fifty challenge funds 
operating broadly within the field of international development. . These were 
identified through key informant interviews combined with a review of secondary 
literature and an internet search that included the websites of official aid agencies 
affiliated to the OECD Development Assistance Committee.3  The 65 funds initially 
identified were then screened against the definition of a challenge fund presented 
above, along with three additional criteria: that the fund had been in operation during 
or since 2010; that sufficient data was available about it; and that the source and use 
of funds wasnot restricted to a single country.  We cannot claim the resulting sample 
of fifty is definitive - the search having been  restricted to English language websites, 
for example. But it does nevertheless provide a useful starting point for analysing 
variation in CF characteristics.4 
The original research plan was to explore variation in selected CFs using 
cluster analysis, but this proved impossible due to the lack of more comprehensive 
data about fund specific variation in the seven characteristics of funds identified 
                                               
3 The key informant interviews were undertaken with staff of Triple Line Consulting, a UK 
based consulting firm specialised in challenge fund management in the field of international 
development. 
4 For example, our list excludes single country social funds intended for post-conflict 
reconstruction (such as discussed by Mallet and Slater, 2013). It also excludes academic 
research funds despite the fact some of them – particularly for agricultural and health - do 
meet all the characteristics of challenge funds identified above and can also be linked to 
international development goals (Poulton and Macartney, 2012:102-104). The language 
restriction excluded, for example, funds managed by the Omidyar Network in Spanish and 
Portuguese speaking countries.  
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above and elaborated upon in Table 2. Instead, variation in CFs (including the 
prevalence of hands-on versus light touch designs) is analysed by following an a 
priori distinction between two broad types of fund.The term enterprise challenge fund 
(ECF) refers to funds oriented towards business promotion and making markets 
work better for poor people. Social and civil society challenge funds (SCFs for short) 
contribute primarily to pursuit of wider social, economic and civic goals including 
promoting human rights, public sector accountability and poverty reduction. In 
contrast to ECFs, the case for funding rests solely on the impact on intended 
beneficiaries, without its effect on fund recipients themselves also being expected to 
pass a strict business test. Funds that could not be unambiguously classified in 
either group were allocated to an intermediate or hybrid category.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Our key informants linked the distinction between ECFs and SCFs with separate 
arenas of development activity and discourse: of private sector development, the 
market and economic growth for ECFs; and of social development, needs, rights, 
governance and justice through civil society and public action for SCFs. However, it 
also reflects a structural difference in theories of change and the criteria by which 
fund performance is assessed (Copestake, 2013). This hinges on whether the 
primary goal of successful grantees is to secure a financial return from their 
customers/clients, or to provide funds or services to them regardless of financial 
return.5 In both cases the ultimate public goal is to benefit one or more categories of 
final end users, whether as customers, clients, workers, members, beneficiaries or 
                                               
5 This in turn has important implications for the nature of performance feedback loops to intended 
beneficiaries: the repeat business or “exit” loop being stronger for ECFs; and the political 
accountability or “voice” loop being stronger for SCFs (Hirschman, 1970). 
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citizens. But in the case of ECFs an important intermediate performance indicator is 
the financial self-sustainability of the grant recipient. Grants are also expected to 
pass a development test, often linked to overcoming market failures or providing 
public goods, but passing this test is in itself not sufficient. In contrast, while SCFs do 
also take value-for-money, cost-effectiveness and capacity building into account, 
they focus less on how funds contribute to the grant recipient’s own financial self-
sustainability, placing a stronger emphasis on the social, economic and political 
impact of the services provided.  
 
Variation in scope, purpose and agency involvement. 
Table 3 provides summary information on the scope, purpose and agency 
involvement of the fifty selected challenge funds. 21 were classified as ECFs, 23 as 
SCFs and six as hybrids. Further details of each can be found in the Appendix. The 
challenge funds identified operate at global, regional and national levels, with ECFs 
more likely to be regional or national, and SCFs more likely to be global or regional 
in scope. Two-thirds are partly or fully funded by DFID, and half are supported by 
more than one donor. A leading example of a single donor SCF is DFID’s Civil 
Society Challenge Fund (CSCF). This has financed UK based NGOs and their civil 
society partners in southern countries globally since 2000. It aims to reduce poverty 
and promote voice, inclusion and critical services for poor people and marginalised 
and vulnerable groups globally, but particularly in challenging environments (CSCF, 
2013:9). A leading example of a multiple donor ECF is the Africa Enterprise 
Challenge Fund (AECF). To date this has provided £130.6 million to support private 
sector businesses in Africa with interest free loans and grants intended to innovative, 
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commercially viable, high impact projects in the areas of agribusiness, finance, 
renewable energy and adaptation to climate change (AECF, 2013; AECF, 2013b:8).  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
As expected, ECFs are targeted more at for profit enterprises and SCFs at NGOs. 
An example of a hybrid fund is the joint USAID-DFID Development Innovation 
Ventures (DIV) fund, which is open to international NGOs, entrepreneurs, public-
private partnerships and academic research teams. This fund has a broad remit to 
“tap into promising solutions to core development challenges, from anyone, 
anywhere” (DIV, 2013), and like many funds it also specifies more than one target 
activity. This mirrors the wide range of stated goals across the fifty challenge funds: 
with only three mentioned by more than twenty percent of them: enterprise 
promotion (34%), poverty reduction (26%) and improved governance (22%). 
Some challenge funds are also restricted to a single country. For example, 
SIDA’s Emprender Paz challenge fund aims to encourage private businesses in 
Colombia to link profit-making with “peace-building initiatives” (SIDA, 2013), while 
Shiree (the DFID Economic Empowerment of the Poorest Programme) aims to help 
Bangladesh achieve the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of eradicating of 
extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 (Shiree 2013). DFID is also a strong supporter 
of regional funds that encourage cross-country linkages. For example the 
Agricultural Technology Transfer Research Challenge Fund (Agri-TT) facilitates links 
between developing countries and China to accelerate agricultural technology 
transfer (Agri-TT, 2013). 
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Variation in fund terms 
Data on the value of funds supplied is patchy, but the typical fund has an overall 
value of around £40 million, with ECFs generally being typically half this size, and 
SCFs slightly larger (see Table 4).6 The smallest fund in the sample is the Business 
Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund, worth just under £2 million. This aims to 
“contribute to the creation of a more enabling business environment for development 
and growth of the … private sector” in Ghana (BUSAC, 2012). The largest fund in 
the sample is the DFID-funded Global Poverty Action Fund (GPAF) with total funds 
available of nearly £150 million. This aims to “support projects that focus on poverty 
reduction and contribute towards the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals” (Government of the United Kingdom, 2013:1).  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The tendency for SCFs to be larger is reflected in higher minimum and maximum 
grant sizes, along with typical grant funding periods of just under three years 
compared to just over two years for ECFs. The shortest grant period is three months, 
for the GSMA mWomen Innovation Fund for mobile network operators (GSMA 
mWomen, 2013:10). At the other extreme the DFID Human Development Innovation 
Fund for Tanzania, offers project funding for up to four and a half years (DFID, 
2013:3). 
The average size of a grant or subsidy across the full sample was £155,000, 
with the largest available being £6.4 million (US$10 million) from the ClimDev 
Special Fund (Climate Finance Options 2013). On the assumption that typical grant 
                                               
6 Data on average grant size was found for only seven of the funds, the mean figure across 
them being £207,582.  
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size was equidistant between these maxima and minima it can be estimated that the 
typical ECF had 37 grantees, whereas the typical SCF had 38. There is scope for 
further research into this topic in order to cast light on whether challenge funds of 
different types may be subject to economies and diseconomies scale, arising from 
the tension between spreading fixed management costs and retaining specialised 
focus, for example. 
Table 5 indicates that SCFs are more likely to provide full grants, and ECFs 
only partial funding of proposed activities (Government of the United Kingdom, 
2013b). Matching within ECFs is most often 50%, but this can be flexible. For 
example, the Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund (FRICH) expects grantees to 
cover at least half project costs (Ceres, 2013), whereas the Afghanistan Business 
Innovation Fund assesses the value of the grant required to generate sufficent return 
on the applicant's investment (Imurabba, 2013; ITAD, 2013).  
 
Variation in screening and selection. 
As a form of business subsidy, challenge funds are susceptible to the adverse 
selection problem of attracting opportunistic bids from organisations unable to secure 
funding from other sources, adding to the importance of robust screening and 
management mechanisms. A majority of funds (62%) are operated through a 
contracted fund manager, whose core responsibilities generally include project 
screening, financial monitoring and risk management. Under the Global Poverty 
Action and Civil Society Challenge funds, for example, DFID (the funder) is 
responsible for fund design, policy direction and overall decision making, while the 
fund manager has an advisory role and executes decisions taken by DFID (covering 
funding mechanisms, financial and programme management, transparency and 
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accountability, reporting on impact and learning) while grant holders remain formally 
accountable to DFID. Fund management may also be combined with responsibility 
for monitoring and evaluation of fund use, but in at least 15 cases this was 
contracted to a separate organisation.7  
 Most fund managers are private for-profit firms, appointed through competitive 
tendering processes.8 The contractual role ascribed to them by donors can be 
viewed as varying across a spectrum. A relatively light touch approach entails little or 
no involvement in implementation of funded activities. More hands-on fund 
management, in contrast, entails them being required to exert considerable influence 
on projects, including through direct involvement in the performance management 
systems of recipients and associated capacity building. Over the course of the last 
decade, DFID has tended to encourage a more hands-on approach to fund 
management, and gone some way towards elaborating explicit ‘theories of change’ 
for this role (e.g. Triple Line Consulting & Crown Agents 2012).  
 Challenge fund websites hosted by donors do not generally supply 
information about application and acceptance rates. Nor do they detail advertising 
and management costs relative to the value of funds disbursed.9 But most do 
provide qualitative information about how grantees are screened and recruited. 
Marketing mechanisms associated with challenge funds include print advertising, 
radio, websites, e-mail circulation to relevant networks and lists applicants from 
previous funding rounds, and pre-launch workshops. This raises the issue of trade-
                                               
7 The 15 comprised 7 ECFs, 6 SCFs and 2 hybrids. 16 websites indicated M&E was 
contracted to the fund manager and 19 did not indicate who was responsible.  
8 The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2013) reports that private sector contractors 
accounted for 9% of DFID total expenditure in 2011/12, but does not indicate what 
proportion of this was channelled to and through challenge funds.  
9 Although some data is published about how challenge funds are used, in part as a 
response the International Aid Transparency Initiative (Development Initiatives, 2012; 
Tierney et al., 2012). For example, the Civil Society Challenge Fund and Global Poverty 
Action Fund are both bound by IATI guidelines.  
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offs between minimising expenditure, achieving a fair coverage of potentially eligible 
groups, and generating sufficient quantity and quality of bids. While some indirect 
benefits may arise from unsuccessful bid preparation net benefits to bidders, fund 
managers, donors and the wider public clearly diverge considerably. For example, 
restricting advertising or selection to previous winners reduces overall selection 
costs, but to the potential detriment of equity of opportunity and originality of 
proposals.10 Nor can it be assumed that overall value-for-money is the over-riding 
consideration for selecting challenge funds over other funding mechanisms given 
that they may also be a useful way for donors to achieve other goals, including rapid 
fund disbursement. Another possible benefit is to reduce direct donor overhead costs 
by passing them down the aid chain to bidders, but the apparent value-for-money of 
a challenge fund may also be improved by hiding costs up the chain. Challenge 
funds can also be viewed as a means to strengthen public-private partnership on 
ideological grounds, to leverage private funding to offset public funding shortfalls, 
and to diversify donor partners and funding routes away from host governments in 
areas of conflict (e.g. see Mallet and Slater, 2013).  
 Many challenge funds manage the application process in two stages, with a 
light touch expression of interest stage, followed by full submission. For example, the 
DFID-funded Tanzania Zonal Innovation Fund issues a first call for concept notes 
from which it compiles a short-list of potential grant holders (Economic Development 
Initiatives Ltd., 2009:2).11 The donor may provide funding and/or technical support for 
                                               
10Cunningham et al. (2012:6) highlights the danger of this “halo” effect in the case of 
subsidies for business R&D, while Poulton and Macartney (2012:103) also suggest that 
“without active and on-going efforts to market a fund it runs the danger of servicing a small 
number of private actors, whose motives for engagement could readily slip from help for 
innovation to rent-seeking.” 
11 Other examples, include the Shell Springboard innovation prize (Shell Springboard, 2013), 
the Children and Violence Evaluation Challenge Fund (The Children and Violence 
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one or both of these stages – GPAF being an example. The USAID “Powering 
Agriculture: An Energy Grand Challenge for Development Fund” provides seed 
funding for preparation and submission of shortlisted proposals (Federal Business 
Opportunities, 2013). Additional variation arises from the involvement of independent 
assessors, donors and fund managers in screening, as well as the use of light touch 
windows for augmenting funding to existing grantees (DIV being an example).  
 
Implementation, risk sharing and evaluation.   
The issue of choosing the right balance between a light touch and a hands-on 
approach to challenge fund management persists once projects have been 
approved. The highest levels of monitoring and supervision are likely to be 
associated with the classic principal-agent scenario where both goal congruence 
between funders and grant recipients is low, and the extent of information 
asymmetry between them with respect to factors contributing to project outcomes is 
high (Waterman and Meier, 1998). In contrast, where goals and relevant knowledge 
are better aligned challenge funds relations can operate with a lighter touch that 
relies more on co-production, partnership and collective action (Booth, 2012). 
Possible pay-offs to devolving autonomy over implementation to grantees arise not 
only from tapping local knowledge and specialist expertise of grantees, but also 
through synergy with their other activities, and piggy-backing on their established 
governance and accountability mechanisms. The reputational consequences of 
success or failure of a project may also be greater for staff in a relatively small grant 
receiving agency than it would be within a larger donor bureaucracy. Challenge 
funds also have the additional political advantage for donors of distancing them from 
                                                                                                                                                  
Evaluation Challenge Fund, 2013), Innovations Against Poverty (SIDA, 2012), and the 
Ashen International Award (Ashen, 2013). 
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risky or sensitive activities, at least to the extent that grantees are more locally 
owned and accepted. At the same time, grantees can benefit politically as well as 
financially from the external funding link.12  
 What is clear from even this brief discussion is that the issue of cost-effective 
management of challenge fund projects cannot be separated from questions of risk 
sharing. Nearly all challenge funds invite applicants to be innovative in project 
design. The justification for ECFs also includes reference to insurance market 
failures, and this argument also applies to SCFs to the extent that public sector 
providers of welfare services may be deterred from innovating by fear of the 
reputational consequences of failure. While rarely explicitly stated, some willingness 
on the part of the donor to share the risks of project failure is integral to challenge 
funds, and to the lengths donors are willing to go to recover funds from any project 
that fails to achieve its full stated purpose. Challenge funds also reflect tacit 
understanding that the outcomes of development activities are often unavoidably 
uncertain, particularly in complex, unstable and highly diverse contexts.13 This is an 
important counter to the tendency to view aid in purely hydraulic terms, with 
predetermined theories of change linking final impact (or ‘outcome’ additionality) to 
the relaxation of capital constraints and other forms of ‘input’ additionality.14 
                                               
12 See Booth (2013) for a discussion of the advantages of “arms-length” approaches to aid, 
and Collier (2013) for an exploration of aid for public private partnerships as a means to 
promote “pioneer investment”. Host governments are of course also wise to this approach, 
and can respond by imposing strict limits on the external funding local organisations can 
receive and how it is spent.  
13 For more general discussion of this point see Hirschman (1967), Easterly (2006), Rigg 
(2012), and Natsios (2012), whose powerful critique of USAID audit culture leads to the 
thesis that development impact is inversely proportional to efforts made to measure and 
control it. 
14 This in turn explains the full significance of the subsidy rate. Cunningham et al. (2012:6), 
for example, suggest that for business R&D subsidies the substitution effects (i.e. lower input 
additionality and crowding out) fall sharply when it exceeds 20% of their total investment. 
They also make a useful distinction between direct outcome and indirect “behavioural” 
additionality arising, the latter arising from changes in institutions and attitudes. 
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 Different challenge funds do signal varying risk appetites. The GPAF, for 
example, clearly states that it “balances higher risk for higher rewards from 
innovative work and lower risk for work to deliver tried and tested approaches” for 
both its Community Partnership and Impact windows (Government of the United 
Kingdom, 2013), while the CSCF which closed to new grants in 2011 aspired to fund 
“innovative service delivery in challenging environments”.  Both AECF and the 
Afghan Business Innovation Fund also explicitly welcome bids based on riskier 
business models (Imurabba, 2013b; AECF, 2012:9). However, no fund, to our 
knowledge, offers precise guidelines or benchmarks for what amount of project 
failure is acceptable, or more importantly, what level of project success is acceptable 
and how best to measure it, particularly for previously untested projects and ideas 
(Elliot, 2012; Cunningham et al., 2012:6). 
 To the extent that the architects of challenge funds are indeed informed by a 
laudable appreciation of uncertainty and the importance of risk sharing, then there is 
a potential moral hazard problem that grantees may forego taking sensible measures 
to mitigate the risk of project failure in the knowledge that these are less likely to be 
punished. This helps to explain why an emphasis on grantee autonomy and 
innovation is not at all inconsistent with a strong emphasis on compliance with 
guidelines for monitoring and evaluation of project activities, including reporting on 
financial expenditure, results and lesson learning. A more positive point leading to 
the same conclusion is that effective learning and dissemination is particularly 
necessary and important for new and innovative activities seeking new ways of 
achieving difficult goals. Demand for strong evaluation also originates from the 
political requirement to account for the use of public money, particularly when 
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transferred to private companies and in the context of public spending cuts.15 There 
is likely to be scope for simplifying and standardising guidelines, contracts and 
compliance mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating challenge funds, to reduce 
fragmentation and duplication of effort arising from donor and fund specific 
requirements and idiosyncrasies. 
 One dimension of this variation is again between light-touch and hands-on 
fund management. In addition, there is variation in how far challenge funds impose 
their own self-contained monitoring and reporting mechanisms or can rely on those 
that grantees already have in place for reporting to others. An example of the former 
is the Tanzania Zonal Innovation Fund, where receipt of funds was conditional on 
grantees completing grant management training on reporting requirements, financial 
control and overall fund dispersal procedures (Economic Development Initiatives 
Ltd., 2009). The ClimDev Special Fund explicitly seeks harmonization with the 
grantees’ own reporting mechanisms, and those of independent “implementing 
agencies” (African Development Bank, 2009:11). More generally, challenge funds 
tend to reflect the results-based management culture of their sponsoring donors: 
complete with theories of change, logical frameworks, quality assurance, auditing 
processes and impact evaluation requirements. Consolidation or pooling of funds 
between donors is also one route to procedural harmonization in pursuit of aid 
effectiveness.  
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into a more detailed review of 
monitoring, evaluation and learning systems, but one specific point worth highlighting 
                                               
15 Martens (2002) provides a formal model to explain why funding for aid evaluation is likely 
to be sub-optimal. However, this pessimistic view is not wholly borne out by more recent 
evidence. In the UK, the work of the International Development Select Committee is 
particularly important, to which the Independent Commission for Aid Impact reports. More 
official resources are also going to independent bodies like 3ie, adding to substantial  aid 
accountability activities of media, lobby groups, think tanks, NGOs and universities. 
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is the relationship between challenge fund evaluation at the individual project level 
and evaluation at the overall fund level. At one extreme there need be no 
expectation of synergy between projects, the rationale for a challenge fund resting 
instead on specialisation and cost-effectiveness in supply of funding, including scope 
for cost saving in monitoring, auditing and sample evaluation. At the other extreme, 
systemic impact may be critically important to the public purpose of the challenge 
fund, with important implications for the way it is evaluated (Kessler, 2013). In the 
case of value-chain specific ECFs, for example, possible systemic effects include 
market leadership, championing of innovation, imitation, forward and backward 
linkages, and support for collective action, including better regulation.16  
 This discussion also raises the question of who should take responsibility for 
impact evaluation at both project and fund levels. In the case of ECFs there is a 
consensus that private for-profit firms lack both incentives and skills to assess the 
development impact of projects (as opposed to their contribution to business 
sustainability), and should not be required to take responsibility for this (Kessler, 
2013; Collier, 2013). In contrast, non-profit development NGOs have a stronger 
interest in monitoring and evaluating the social impact of their work, but their ability 
to do so with sufficient objectivity, scope, scale and time span is more doubtful. The 
issue of systemic and fund-wide evaluation of challenge funds also relates back to 
the issue of risk, with scope to compare ex ante risk appetite with ex post outcomes 
across the project portfolio for each funding round. An unstated issue here is how far 
donors are willing to accept project failures (in terms of impact if not compliance with 
use of funds) as an acceptable price for backing a few spectacular winners – an 
                                               
16 Johnson and Boulton (2013) provide an innovative example of an impact evaluation that 
employs ideas from ‘complexity theory’ to explore systemic effects of Kenyan Financial 
Sector Deepening Trust. 
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example being early and timely support of M-PESA from the Financial Sector 
Deepening Fund. This also touches on the question of how far challenge funds can 
and should be interlinked with hands-on managerial and technical assistance at the 
definitional boundary with managed funds. 
 
4. Analysis and conclusions  
This article has documented wide use of challenge funds in development 
practice, particularly by the UK Department of International Development. It has 
offered a seven point definition of what challenge funds are and how they differ from 
other development funding mechanisms. Drawing on web-based information for fifty 
funds it has also reviewed variation in challenge fund design with respect to scope, 
grantee/project eligibility, proposal screening, competition, financial terms, and 
division of labour in implementation and in risk sharing. This discussion distinguished 
between enterprise challenge funds (ECFs) oriented towards business development, 
and social and civil society challenge funds (SCFs) oriented more towards social 
development, direct poverty alleviation and public service delivery. This distinction 
reflection differences in the principal-agency relationship typical of each sector. The 
main goals of ECFs, principally small business promotion and employment creation, 
are both relatively easy to measure and shared between funder and grantee. This 
means that evaluating fund impact, or additionality, can draw heavily on performance 
data collected by fund recipients for their own purposes, and this in turn allows for a 
more hands-off approach to monitoring and influencing grant use and impact 
evaluation by the funder. In the extreme case, it may be possible to forego 
monitoring completely, on the basis that (a) competitive selection is a sufficient 
mechanism for selecting the best grantees and (b) what is good for the successful 
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recipients is also good for the funder (Blattman et al., 2013, documents a good 
example).  
At the other extreme is the case where limited goal congruence between 
funders and recipients means that more hands-on monitoring and evaluation is 
required no matter how competitive and rigorous the goal selection process. This is 
generally the case for SCFs, for which the business or capacity building effect of 
grant on recipients is of secondary importance relative to the impact of their activities 
on poor people and other primary intended beneficiaries. These intended outcomes 
are not only distinct from the corporate goals of grantees, but also often harder to 
measure and to attribute to additional funding. Davis and Elgar (2014) point out that 
this is indeed also the case for ECFs where their purpose is to influence the 
behaviour of larger and more established business recipients of grants, rather than 
to augment the capacity of newer and smaller businesses to grow and create jobs 
directly.  
This distinction illustrates the general point that striking an appropriate 
balance of power and responsibility between fund providers (including their 
appointed fund managers) and grant recipients depends critically on the extent to 
which grantee goals are transparent and congruent with those of the funder. If 
screening and selection can clearly establish this, then fewer resources need to be 
invested in monitoring and evaluation. Conversely, where goals are less congruent 
and/or less evaluable (DFID, 2013), then the cost-effectiveness of challenge funds is 
weakened by the potential requirements for reporting to ensure compliance with 
original proposals. In this case the value-for-money of challenge funds depends not 
only on selecting the best proposals but also those already subject to strong 
accountability mechanisms. In other words, challenge funds that seek to use 
22 
 
grantees rather than to empower them (i.e. in the absence of goal congruence) are 
most likely to be cost-effective if grantees are already strongly accountable to other 
stakeholders who share the same goals as the funders. These may include NGO 
trustees, charity supporters, members, customers and other donor agencies. In other 
words, challenge funds can be viewed as a mechanism for leveraging underutilised 
governance capacity (cf. Williamson, 2002) 
This article raises numerous questions for further research. First, publicly 
available evidence on the impact of challenge fund grants is fragmented and in short 
supply. It is not uncommon for grant recipients to be required to conduct evaluations, 
but the quality of these studies is highly variable particularly when it comes to 
addressing attribution problems in assessment of impact. Estimates of the combined 
effects of all grants provided by a challenge fund, including indirect and systemic 
effects, is particularly scarce, making it hard to assess evidence of celebrated 
successes (such as M-Pesa in Kenya or WING in Cambodia) relative to overall 
spending across the funds that supported them (Davies and Elgar, 2014). Some 
progress in expanding the quality of monitoring and impact evaluation is being made 
at the sector level through establishment of stronger standards: by the Donor 
Consortium for Enterprise Development for private sector development, for example 
(DCED, 2014). This should in time permit more comparative analysis both between 
ECFs and between them and other private sector funding modalities, including social 
venture capital funds.17  
                                               
17 In this respect DCED can be viewed as doing for private sector development what CGAP 
and MIX market did for microfinance. CGAP has championed standards for public and 
private investors in microfinance while the MIX market (www.mixmarket.org) provides instant 
access to financial and social performance information covering approximately 2,000 MFIs 
around the world. 
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Second, where evidence of impact is not available there may still be scope for 
quantitative research into determinants of the quality of investments made by CFs by 
relying on the subjective scoring systems used by fund managers as part of routine 
CF results monitoring. To the extent that these are standardised (e.g. across DFID 
funds) then these may permit comparative analysis of economies of scale and scope 
in CF management. Key parameters, such as the ratio of fund applications to awards 
(by number and value) need to be more widely available, for example, in order to 
assess how far different CFs are successful in promoting competition and to what 
effect. Such research could also be complemented by more systematic interview 
based research into how funders, fund managers and grantees perceive trade-offs 
between portfolio quality, risk, grant terms and effort incurred in selection, monitoring 
and evaluation. Qualitative research, based on stakeholder perceptions, is likely 
particularly needed for social and civil society challenge funds that aim at more 
diverse and often hard-to-measure goals, such as promoting human rights. 
Third, a useful complement to empirical work of the kind described above 
would be more theoretical exploration of the synergies and trade-offs entailed in 
designing challenge funds, subject to variation in transparency of goals and values 
between funders and grant recipients, and evaluability of intended outcomes. In 
particular, it would be useful to explore optimal CF design models with respect to 
light touch versus more hands on models of investment in selection and post-grant 
monitoring. Rational choice institutional analysis of this kind need not be limited to 
identifying socially optimum CF designs. For example, while Martens (2002) explore 
the logic behind systematic under-investment in evaluation by politicians and 
intermediaries seeking to protect their discretion, there is also scope for modelling  
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risk averse over-investment in results management (to the detriment of programme 
outcomes) described by Natsios (2010) as “obsessive measurement disorder”. 
Fourth, there is also scope for more open-ended and exploratory research into 
the operation of challenge funds that goes beyond rational choice assumptions by 
critically exploring the mental models adopted by different stakeholders confronting 
the complexity and uncertainty of development practice. Challenge funds are 
potentially consistent with an experiment-and-learn approach to development, also 
described as “problem oriented iterative adaptation” (Andrews et al., 2012). But 
clearly, this potential can easily be undermined if the rules and results management 
systems regulating their operation are too heavy and cumbersome.  Institutional and 
transaction cost economics offer particularly important theoretical insights to inform 
this research agenda (e.g. Martens, 2002; Poulton and Macartney, 2012). However, 
it is important that research into challenge fund structure, conduct, performance and 
evolution should be informed by multi-disciplinary perspectives that take into account 
political and social dimensions of the way they operate. More broadly, they are a 
leading example of bespoke public and private sector interaction combining markets, 
hierarchies and networks. Understanding these evolving relationships is part of a 
wider agenda of research into the evolution of the “post-Washington consensus” 
global development architecture (Gore, 2013). 
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Table 1. Distinguishing challenge funds from other financing mechanisms. 
 1.  
Grant or 
subsidy 
element 
2.  
Explicit 
public 
purpose 
3.  
Inter-
agency 
contract 
4.  
Com-
petitive 
selection 
5. 
Open 
selection 
process 
6.  
Autonomy 
in imple-
mentation 
7.  
Risk 
shar-
ing 
Challenge fund Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Open research 
grants 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Managed funds ?18 ? ? ? ? Y Y 
Prize fund Y ? ? ? ? Y ? 
Technical assistance  Y Y Y ? ? ? Y 
Advanced market 
commitment 
Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Social investment 
bond 
Y Y Y ? Y Y N 
Social impact 
investing 
? Y Y N N Y Y 
Public investment  Y Y N ? ? N Y 
        
Venture capital fund N N ? ? ? ? Y 
Public procurement  N ? Y Y Y N N 
Source: elaborated by authors 
 
 
Table 2. Some sources of variation in challenge funds 
Challenge fund 
characteristic 
Possible variants 
(1) Grant or subsidy 
component 
Level of requirement for matching and/or leveraged 
funding from other sources. Entitlement to follow-up 
grants, loans or tranches.  
(2) Specified public intent  Choice of sector(s), goals, indicators and standards 
for monitoring them. 
(3) Inter-agency 
relationship 
Legal status of agreement. The extent to which the 
funder retains influence over grantees, including 
political leverage. 
(4) Eligibility and the 
extent of competition. 
How and how widely funds are marketed. Broader or 
narrower eligibility criteria.   
(5) Screening and 
selection rules and 
procedures  
Design guidelines and selection criteria. 
Transparency and independence of assessment. 
Number of rounds and overall cost. 
(6) Grantee autonomy in 
bid implementation 
Complexity of guidelines. Extent to which compliance 
with them is monitored and enforced. 
(7) Risk sharing to 
promote innovation 
Permitted variation in activities and outcomes without 
triggering sanctions. 
Source: elaborated by authors 
 
                                               
18 A question mark indicates that common use of the term implies neither that the 
characteristic is met or that it is not.  
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Table 3. Variation in scope, purpose and agency involvement. 
 ECF SCF Hybrid Total 
Total number of cases 21 23 6 50 
       of which…     
 global coverage 3 8 4 15 
 regional 12 7 1 20 
 one country only 6 8 1 15 
 DFID funded 12 18 3 33 
 multiple funders  10 11 4 25 
Eligible to be a grant holder19     
 Civil Society Organisation  7 19 4 30 
 Enterprise 16 11 4 31 
 Other20 5 9 5 19 
 Mixed 4 12 4 20 
Stated sectors/activities     
 Agriculture 7 - - 7  
 Civil society  1 - 1  
 Climate Change 3 3 3 9  
 Construction - 2 - 2  
 Democratisation - 3 - 3  
 Education 2 6 - 8  
 Economic growth 2 1 - 3  
 Enterprise 14 1 2 17  
 Food security 3 1 - 4  
 Gender 1 2 - 3  
 Governance - 9 2 11  
 Health 1 6 1 8  
 Finance 1 1 1 3  
 Hunger reduction - 6 - 6  
 Forestry - - 1 1  
 Livelihoods 4 1 - 5  
 Legal reform - 2 - 2  
 Market failures 1 - - 1  
 Social inclusion - 2 - 2  
 Technology 2 - 1 3  
 Trade policy 1 1 - 2  
 Poverty reduction 6 4 3 13  
 Water & sanitation - 3 - 3 
Source: Appendix 
 
  
                                               
19 Data missing for one fund. 
20 Including academic institutions, research institutes, co-operatives and mixed consortia. 
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Table 4. Variation in terms of funding available. 
 ECFs SCFs Hybrid Total Cases 
with 
data 
Total number of cases  21 23 6 50  
      
Mean fund value (£ million) 19.7 45.8 68.3    38.9 32 
Mean minimum  grant size (£ ‘000)  92.4 263.5 45.0  154.6 30 
Mean maximum grant size (£ ‘000)  964.9 2,162.7 323.0     1,652.7 37 
Average grant duration (years) 2.0 2.9 1.7 2.4 18 
Number of cases with…      
 cost sharing 14 5 4 23 42 
 full grants 4 14 0 18 42 
Source: Appendix 
 
 
Appendix. List of challenge funds analysed. 
 
Enterprise challenge funds 
 
Fund Name Scale Fund 
Size (UK 
GBP, 
million) 
Fund Manager(s) Other donors Date of Activity Cost 
sharing? 
Afghanistan Business 
Innovation Fund 
Country 8.5 Landell Mills AusAid, DFID 2012-2014 Yes 
Africa Enterprise 
Challenge Fund 
Regional 130.6 KPMG Development 
Services Ltd 
CGAP, DFID, IFAD, 
RNE, SIDA 
2006 (ongoing) Yes 
Agricultural 
Technology Transfer 
Research Challenge 
Fund 
Regional 3 Landell Mills DFID 2013-2016 No 
Business Innovation 
Facility 
Regional 5.5  DFID 2010-2013 Yes 
Construction Ideas 
Fund (Nigeria) 
Country  Coffey International 
(GEMS Contruction 
and Real Estate 
Project) 
DFID 2013 (ongoing) Yes 
Enterprise Challenge 
Fund 
Regional 7.25  
(to date) 
Coffey International AusAid 2007-2013 Yes 
Enterprise Innovation 
Challenge Fund 
Regional 26.55 Compete Caribbean CIDA, DFID, IDB Ongoing Yes 
Food Retail Industry 
Challenge Fund 
Regional 7.64 Nathan Associates DFID 2007 (ongoing) Yes 
GSMA mWomen 
Innovation Fund 
Regional 4.1 Coffey International AusAid, USAID, Visa 2013 (ongoing) Yes 
Innovation Fund for 
the Americas 
Regional   DFID, Gates 
Foundation, DFID 
2013-ongoing ? 
Innovations Against 
Poverty 
Global 2.58  
(to date) 
PWC SIDA 2010 (ongoing) Yes 
Latin America Impact 
Economy Innovations 
Fund 
Regional 0.55 
(2012) 
 Fundación Avina, 
Avina Americas, 
Omidyar Network, The 
Rockefeller 
Foundation 
2012 (ongoing) No 
Malawi Innovation 
Challenge Fund 
Country 7.6  DFID, UNDP 2013 (ongoing) ? 
mFarmer Initiative 
Challenge Fund 
Regional  Coffey International Bill & Melinda Gate 
Foundation, USAID 
2011-2014 Yes 
Powering Agriculture: 
An Energy Grand 
Challenge for 
Development 
Global 13.05  SIDA, USAID, Duke 
Energy, USDA, OPIC 
2012 (ongoing) No 
Responsible & 
Accountable Garment 
Regional 3.5 Maxwell Stamp PLC DFID 2010-2013 Yes 
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Sector 
Shell Springboard Global 2.25  
(to date) 
 - 2005-going No 
Tanzania Zonal 
Innovation Fund (RIU) 
Country   DFID 2008-2012 ? 
The Sawaed 
Programme 
Regional   Mohammed in Rashid 
Al Maktoum 
Foundation 
2009 (ongoing) Yes 
UN Joint Programme 
1 on Wealth Creation, 
Employment and 
Economic 
Empowerment 
Challenge Fund 
Country   ILO 2009 (ongoing) Yes 
Vietnam Business 
Challenge Fund 
Country  SNV DFID 2012-2015 Yes 
 
Hybrid challenge funds 
 
Fund Name Scale Fund 
Size (UK 
GBP, 
millions) 
Fund Manager Other donors Date of Activity Cost 
sharing? 
Ashden Global ?  Christian Aid, Citibank, 
Eurostar, Impax, The 
World Bank 
2001 (ongoing) ? 
Business Sector 
Advocacy Challenge 
Fund 
Country 1.96 COWI DFIDD, Danida, EU, 
USAID 
2004 (ongoing) Yes 
COOP Africa 
Challenge Fund 
Regional 0.42 
(round 
1) 
COOPAfrica ILO 2008 (ongoing) Yes 
Development 
Innovation Ventures 
Global   DFID, USAID 2013-2015 Yes 
Forest Governance 
Markets and Climate 
Programme 
Global 60  DFID 2010-2021 ? 
Grand Challenges 
Canada 
Global 143  Government of 
Canada, Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation 
2008-2013 Yes 
 
Social and civil society challenge funds 
Fund Name Scale Fund 
Size (UK 
GBP, 
millions) 
Fund Manager Donors Date of Activity Cost 
sharing? 
Bangladesh Health 
Innovation Challenge 
Fund 
Country  GRM International DFID 2013-Present ? 
Canadian Fund for 
African Climate 
Resistance 
Regional 12.42  CIDA 2012-2014 Yes 
Civil Society 
Challenge Fund 
Global 56.51 Triple Line Consulting, 
Crown Agents 
DFID 2002- 2015 No 
Civil Society Support 
Programme 
Country 30.15 Consortium - British 
Council, IDL, INTRAC 
DANIDA, Irish Aid, 
Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, RNE, 
SIDA, UKAID 
2012-2017 No 
Climate & 
Development 
Knowledge Network 
Innovation Fund 
Regional 1.1  
(to date) 
 DFID 2011 (ongoing) Yes & 
No 
Development 
Awareness Fund 
Country 24 Triple Line Consulting DFID 2006-2013 No 
Economic 
Empowerment of the  
Poorest Programme 
(SHIREE) 
Country 65 Harewelle 
International Ltd, 
PMTC Bangladesh, 
Bath University, British 
Council, Unnayan 
Shamannay 
DFID, Gov. of 
Bangladesh 
2005-2016 ? 
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Emprender Paz Country 7.85  SIDA 2008 (ongoing) ? 
Financial Education 
Fund 
Regional 3.74 Cardno Emerging 
Markets, Genesis 
Analytics 
DFID 2008-2013 No 
Girls' Education 
Challenge Fund 
Global 55 PWC, FHI 360, 
Nathan Associates, 
Social Development 
Direct Ltd 
DFID 2011-2016 No 
Global Poverty Action 
Fund 
Global 149.47 Triple Line Consulting, 
Crown Agents 
DFID 2011-2016 Yes & 
No 
Governance & 
Transparency Fund 
Global 130 KPMG Development 
Services Ltd 
DFID 2007-2013 No 
Health Enterprise 
Fund 
Regional  Abt Associates DFID, USAID 2013 (ongoing) No 
Human Development 
Innovation Fund for 
Tanzania 
Country 30  DFID 2013-2018 Yes 
Humanitarian 
Innovation Initiative 
Global 9.5  DFID, USAID 2013-2015 Yes 
Making All Voices 
Count- A Grand 
Challenge for 
Development 
Global 29.43 Hivos DFID, Omidyar 
Network, SIDA, 
USAID 
2013 (ongoing) No 
Rights & Governance 
Challenge Fund 
Country 37.98 Manusher Jonno 
Foundation 
DFID, RNE 2008- 2013 No 
Rights, Democracy & 
Inclusion Fund 
Country 7.47 GRM International AusAid, Danida, DFID, 
SDC 
2006 (ongoing) No 
Sightsavers Innovation 
Fund 
Global 1  DFID 2012 (ongoing) No 
The Arab Partnership 
Economic Facility 
Regional 70  DFID, FCO 2011-2015 ? 
The Arab Partnership 
Participation Fund 
Regional 20  DFID, FCO 2013-2017 ? 
The Children and 
Violence Evaluation 
Challenge Fund 
Global 0.65  
(round 
1) 
NEF (Network of 
European 
Foundations) 
Oak Foundation, 
Bernard van Leer 
Foundation, UBS 
Optimus Foundation 
2011 (ongoing) No 
The ClimDev Special 
Fund 
Regional 19.33 African Development 
Bank (ADB) 
African Development 
Bank, SIDA, African 
Union Commission, 
UN Economic 
Commission for Africa 
2012-2014 ? 
 
